Abstract
Reforms are one of the management solutions and increasing the ability of governments has been considered for a long time. But the nature, methods, manner and extent of its implementation were determined according to the needs of the society. The elites of Aq-Qoyunlu made reforms in three stages, one of these reforms was carried out during the period of Sultan Yaqub and with the efforts of Qazi Isa Savoji Sadr. Judge Isa's reforms are a continuation of the reform process of Hassan the king. On the one hand, the Mongol order was weakened by the fall of the Mongol governments and did not meet the needs of the Iranian society. On the other hand, Iranian society had made a big leap towards the revival of Iranian-Islamic traditions. Because he saw the cure for his pains in these traditions. By analyzing the ambiguity of the historical narratives of this period, this article tries to analyze the background, causes, nature and obstacles of Qazi Isa Savoji's reforms. Although the Qazi reforms can be seen as a link of intellectual continuity and historical necessity of reforms in Iran; But the harmony of the interests of some Iranian (religious scholars) and Turkish (soldiers) social groups in the continuation of the Mongol tradition provided the failure and destruction of the factors of these reforms. The findings show that the dominance of the chiefs of the provinces and the cooperation of the scholars and Fiefholders with them was an important obstacle in the success of the reforms. Historical data showed that the reformers, unlike the opposition, did not have popular support. They had started reforming based on the power of the government and the consent of the Sultan. But the power of the sultan was not enough in the clan-based political system. The sultan did not have superior power without the accompaniment of tribal leaders.
Keywords: Iran, Aq-Qoyunlu, Sultan Yaqub, Qazi-Isa Savoji, reform
 
Introduction
Reforms are considered one of the main tools in the process of creating changes in the structures of society and transitioning to a desirable state. Governments are faced with various issues that must be resolved in some way. Reforms have long been a management strategy and an increase in the capabilities of governments, and have been the focus of the power elite. However, the nature, method, manner and scope of its implementation were determined according to the needs of society.
During the transition period, the process of transformation is random, scattered and unpredictable, shallow, costly and violent. Reforms are self-organizing in adapting structures to new conditions; this does not mean that reforms arise spontaneously and are self-generated, but rather that the birth of reforms requires reformist and development-minded elites. Elites assess the existing situation, adapt the efficiency and inefficiency of existing structures to the conditions, and prepare to deal with the crisis. Of course, anti-reform elites also play a pivotal role in postponing changes. So reforms, meaning creating transformation and changing the status quo or part of it, endanger the interests of certain segments of society, and this in turn leads to reaction and resistance.
 
Materials and Methods
The period of the Aq-Qoyunlu is one of the periods in which reform measures can be clearly identified. The reforms of this era can be divided into three periods, considering the time element and content:
The reforms of the period of the rule of Hasan Padeshah, with a financial and commercial nature, which led to the formulation of the "Law of Hasan Padeshah". 2- The reforms of the period of Yaqub, initiated by Judge Safi al-Din Isa Savoji, with a political-military, financial and territorial nature. 3- The reforms of the period of Sultan Ahmad, initiated by Nogtehci Oghli, with a political-military, financial and territorial nature. These three periods of reforms with a similar nature are links in a chain of reformist thinking and policy that was formed in a sensitive period of transition. With the Islamization of the later Ilkhanites, the process of transition of Iranian society from the Mongol order to the Iranian order began.
The main factors that led to and intensified this process can be considered the weakening of the Mongols' military dominance, their familiarity with urban culture, the ineffectiveness of Yasaei culture in responding to new needs, the revival of Iranian culture, and the promotion of Shiism and Sufism, etc. The result of these factors was "doubt" in the procedures, common customs, and the set of laws established under the title of Yasa, and doubt in powerful personalities. The Mongol order in Islamic society, under cultural pressure, suffered from "doubt" in its managerial and legitimacy-building capabilities. "The doubt" gradually spread from the Yasaei sub-order to two other sub-orders and ultimately led to the collapse of the Mongol macro-order. However, since the discourse of any order is mixed into the textures of society, its separation and elimination are not possible at the speed of the collapse of the macro-order. Removing the sediments of discursive dominance from the context of society required time. With the decline and collapse of the Mongol macro-order, the Iranian macro-order was replaced with new characteristics and functions.
The Aq-Qoyunlu elites undertook reforms in three stages, one of which was carried out during the reign of Sultan Yaqub and was carried out by Qazei Isa Savoji Sadr. Qazi Isa's reforms were a continuation of the reforms of King Hassan's reign. On the one hand, the Mongol order was weakened with the fall of the Mongol governments and did not meet the needs of Iranian society, especially the power elite. On the other hand, Iranian society had taken a great leap towards the revival of Islamic-Iranian traditions. Because it saw the cure for its pains in these traditions.
Network of reforming elites Reforms are not a random phenomenon, but rather a deliberate one that requires reforming elites who believe in and build institutions in line with the goals, power-building, and legitimizing ideology. The existing institutions are often inefficient and weak, and the agents are often not convinced of reforms due to their habit or interest in them. Judge Isa, who was the first person to reform in theory and the second person to implement it, began to lay the groundwork for reforms with awareness of the necessity and need for governance. The sources list the names of several prominent figures and several low-level supporters of the reforms. Sultan Yaqub and Suleyman Beycan Oghlu (Atabek), the Sultan's father-in-law, and the Emir of the Divan, were the main supporters of the reforms. Among the kinship center, Imam al-Din Sheikh Ali, the elder brother of Qazi Isa and his deputy in the affairs of Iraq and Persia, Sheikh Najm al-Din Masoud Parvanchi, the nephew of the judge and confidant of Sultan, Qazi Zia al-Din Noorullah Savoji, the nephew of Qazi Isa and the judge of Iraq and Persia, can be mentioned. Other prominent supporters of the reforms include Sheikh Abu Ishaq Neirizi, the judge and Sadr of Shiraz, Amir Abdul Wahab, the judge of Tabriz, Shah Sharaf al-Din Mahmoud Deylami, the minister of the Sultan, Hussein bin Mou'in Meybudi, the judge of Yazd and the originator. The process and nature of reforms A reformer must have the necessary political skills to fill gaps, manage social forces, manage financial resources, manage influence, determine priorities, and select various components of reforms. Qazei Isa, with his civil and political activist background, had the ability and background to understand the complexity of political affairs in two decades of social changes. The defeat of Tarjan, the Ughrullu-Muhammad rebellion, and the failure of Sultan Khalil's reform policies due to numerous rebellions by the princes and tribal nobles of the alliance had exposed the vulnerability of the foundations of Iranian society, namely the crisis of political influence and the financial crisis. It can be inferred from the existing narratives that he prioritized "influence management" because the crisis of influence had deepened the existing ruptures in society.
 
Discussion and Results
Considering this, his reforms can be evaluated and explained at two levels and stages. Political reforms the first stage of political reforms was to overcome the "crisis of influence". The tribal structure of the Aq-Qoyunlu union had essentially imposed a dispersion of power on the political system. The tribal powers scattered in the provinces enjoyed relative independence in behavior and performance.
Social and economic reforms: The reforms at this stage were implemented with different tactics and at two different but successive levels. At this stage, the judge acted in terms of shock tactics and in terms of nature at the social/religious and economic/financial-territorial levels. It is a little difficult to distinguish the boundary between the two levels of reforms. Because social reforms also include land reforms. The nature of the first level of reforms was also related to the field of Sharia. Therefore, the author named the first level social/religious and the second level economic/financial-territorial.
Serious obstacles to the reforms were the connection of the interests of tribal leaders and local landowners and religious figures in the sphere of the Mongol order. The landownership of tribal chiefs and military commanders, which was a natural consequence of the tribal policy of granting sivuorghal, prevented the initiation and continuation of any reformist measures. The extent of the Shah's influence and decrees also faced obstacles and limitations. The landowning nobility prevented the success of the reformers by forcing farmers and peasants to organize a collective protest in front of the provincial court. Scholars and Sufis also questioned the religious legitimacy of the reforms, each from their own perspective and behavior. In general, Qazei's reforms can be considered a detail-oriented reform that is focused on intra-systemic transformation. His reforms aimed at preserving and empowering organized structures so that he could implement his thinking within these structures. The reality is that it is not correct to agree with Khunji and consider his reformist policies personal, but rather complicated the recognition of the factors and necessity of reforms or to deny or hide social needs. While the connection of reforms with the foundations of society led to a deepening of the necessity of reforms. Also, the personalism of reforms led to the neglect of its shortcomings and shortcomings, and consequently, social dissatisfaction was reduced to personal dissatisfaction or excess, which collapsed with the murder of the reformer. On the other hand, rejecting the criticisms of the opponents with the accusation of personalism is equally harmful. Because it blocks the way for any criticism. All social groups, from military emirs and scholars to the masses of the people, expressed joy at the death of the Sultan, the brutal murder of Qazei Isa and Sheikh Ali, and considered the murder to be the result of oppression and tyranny. This article, by analyzing the historical narratives of this period, tries to analyze the background, causes, nature and obstacles to the reforms of Qazi Isa Savoji.
 
Conclusion
Although the reforms of the judge can be considered as a circle of intellectual continuity and historical necessity of reforms in Iran; But the coordination of interests of some Iranian (religious scholars) and Turkish (military) social groups in the continuation of the Mongol order ensured the failure and destruction of the factors of these reforms. The findings show that the Iranian political arena feels the need for reformist elites more than ever before.