Abstract
A prevalent view in Iranian historiography attributes Mohammad Mirza's Crown Princeship to the Treaty of Turkmenchay. This perspective argues that the Treaty's guarantee of succession through Abbas Mirza's lineage compelled Fath Ali Shah, influenced by Russia and treaty obligations, to bypass his other sons and choose his grandson, Mohammad Mirza, as crown prince after Abbas Mirza's death.
Employing a critical, descriptive-explanatory approach, this paper challenges this dominant view and questions the primary role of the Treaty of Turkmenchay in Mohammad Mirza's Crown Princeship, as widely believed. Analyzing Article 7 of the Treaty and re-examining existing historiography, the author demonstrates that the treaty legally granted Russia no right to intervene in his succession. Furthermore, examining the Russian reaction after Abbas Mirza's death and the selection process shows Russia's response was neither immediate nor threatening, but aligned with Fath-Ali Shah's policies. Presenting new historical evidence and analysis of Article 7, this article critiques the prevalent grand narrative and offers a different perspective on Mohammad Mirza's Crown Princeship.
Keywords: Crown Princeship and Succession, Mohammad Mirza, Fath Ali Shah, Abbas Mirza, Treaty of Turkmenchay, Russia.

Introduction
The issue of succession and the selection of the crown prince has always been one of the structural and destabilizing challenges in Iranian history. The lack of codified laws and clear mechanisms for the transfer of power turned this area into an arena for power struggles among claimants. During the Qajar era, Abbas Mirza, in an effort to stabilize his precarious position, sought international support and recognition from foreign powers such as Britain and Russia. These efforts ultimately crystallized in Article VII of the Treaty of Turkmenchay. After Abbas Mirza’s untimely death, his son Mohammad Mirza was appointed as the crown prince. This event formed a dominant grand narrative in contemporary Iranian historiography, according to which the selection of Mohammad Mirza was a direct result of Russian pressure and the legal requirements of the Treaty of Turkmenchay. Many prominent scholars have accepted this premise as a definitive fact, believing that Fath-Ali Shah was forced to select his grandson under pressure and even threats from Russia. This study, with a critical approach, challenges this dominant narrative. The main question is whether the Treaty of Turkmenchay, as reflected in the prevailing historiography, played the central and inevitable role in Mohammad Mirza's succession. The hypothesis of this article is that this view is an exaggerated historical construct and that internal factors, especially the agency and decisions of Fath-Ali Shah, played a more central role in this choice.
Materials and Methods
This research employs a descriptive-explanatory method with a critical approach. The analysis is grounded in a meticulous re-reading and interpretation of the text of Article VII of the Treaty of Turkmenchay, based on the original version in the archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to identify its discrepancies with the common paraphrased versions in historical scholarship. Subsequently, to assess the practical reaction of foreign powers, the research focuses on a chronological analysis of the events following the death of Abbas Mirza (October 1833) until the official appointment of Mohammad Mirza as the crown prince. This section utilizes primary sources, including diplomatic documents and reports, especially the daily journals of Sir John Campbell, the British envoy to Iran, and the commentary by Ebrahim Teymouri on the book "The Last Two Years," which contains the dispatches of British and Russian diplomats. This method allows the research to empirically test the grand narrative's claims of an immediate and threatening Russian response against documented historical evidence.
Discussion and Results
The findings of this research challenge the prevailing narrative on both legal and practical levels.
1. Legal analysis of Article VII of the treaty: A careful analysis of the original text of Article VII shows that this chapter makes no mention of the “offspring” or “descendants” of Abbas Mirza; thus, any claim to guarantee the monarchy within his family lacks textual support. Russia’s support for Abbas Mirza’s crown princeship was merely a “confirmation” of Fath-Ali Shah’s selection and was defined as subordinate to the monarch's will, not an imposition on him. Russia had wisely pledged to recognize Abbas Mirza as king “from the date of his accession to the throne”; this clause allowed Russia to have no obligation to provide military support to him in the event of a war of succession before he had successfully seized power. Therefore, from a legal perspective, the treaty created no right for Russia to interfere in the succession of Mohammad Mirza.
2. Analysis of Russia’s practical behavior: An examination of the course of events after Abbas Mirza’s death shows that Russia’s reaction was neither immediate nor threatening. On the contrary, Fath-Ali Shah immediately (one day after receiving the news) transferred all of Abbas Mirza’s positions to Mohammad Mirza, which indicated his own initial inclination. The British reacted diplomatically before the Russians and implicitly supported Mohammad Mirza. Russia’s official reaction, on the other hand, was notably delayed. The first official message from Tsar Nicholas arrived in Tehran approximately eight months after Abbas Mirza’s death, at which point Mohammad Mirza’s appointment as Crown Prince was practically a fait accompli. This message was also of a confirming, not an imposing, nature. Throughout this period, the main focus of the contenders’ competition was to attract Fath-Ali Shah’s favor, and no party invoked Article VII of the Treaty of Turkmenchay.
This study identifies the reasons for the formation of this grand narrative in four factors: a) the dominant idea of Russia’s absolute influence in nineteenth-century Iran; b) inaccurate readings and paraphrasing of the treaty by historians; c) exaggerated reports by British diplomats intended to activate their country's foreign policy against Russia; and d) efforts by Mohammad Mirza's domestic supporters to create the illusion of foreign support in order to intimidate rivals.
Conclusion
This study argues that the dominant notion of Mohammad Mirza’s succession being dependent on the Treaty of Turkmenchay is a historical construct that is contradicted by legal and historical evidence. An analysis of Article VII of the treaty shows that there was no legal basis for Russian intervention in this matter. Furthermore, an examination of Russia’s political behavior after Abbas Mirza’s death rejects any claim of an immediate, threatening, or coercive response from that country. In contrast, the evidence suggests that Fath-Ali Shah, as the ultimate decision-maker, acted with full autonomy and that the selection of Mohammad Mirza was a product of his own will and political considerations. Although the Shah was aware of the alignment of foreign powers with his decision and considered it a positive variable, this is completely different from a narrative of coercion and obligation. While criticizing this reductionist historical narrative, this article does not intend to exonerate Russian imperialism or downplay the disastrous consequences of the Treaty of Turkmenchay. Rather, it attempts to present a more detailed analysis of a critical period in contemporary Iranian history by highlighting the agency of domestic actors, especially the Shah, and to pave the way for rethinking other similar notions.