Abstract
During the Qajar period, tea was a widely consumed product, whose import imposed a lot of costs on the country. This provided an incentive for tea cultivation inside Iran. With the beginning of tea cultivation in Gilan and after a quarter of a century, the area of tea plantations did not reach 100 hectares. The purpose of this research is to identify the factors affecting the insufficient development of tea cultivation between 1900 and 1925. For this purpose, historical methodology was used to examine government documents and letters left from that period. According to historical documents, Mohammad Mirza Kashif al-Saltaneh, one of the Qajar princes working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was obliged to try in this regard while performing his consul general duty in India by the order of Muzaffaruddin Shah. After his return, despite cultivating tea in Gilan in 1900, he did not succeed in developing tea cultivation. The results of the research indicate that the monopolization of tea cultivation by granting concessions and preventing the formation of a competition institution, the way of promoting tea cultivation, not paying attention to the relationship between the owner and the farmer, requires capital and the late return of tea, along with the structural complexity of the tea industry and the holding of political positions by Kashif Al-Saltaneh should be considered as one of the most important reasons for the failure of tea cultivation in this period.
Keywords: Kashif al-Saltaneh, government protection, Lahijan, the exclusive privilege of tea cultivation, Mozaffar al-Din Shah.
 
Introduction
Tea consumption became a cornerstone of daily life in Iran during the late Qajar era, evolving into a major import commodity that cost the treasury an estimated 6 million qirān annually. Confronted with this significant fiscal drain and inspired by the goal of reducing imports and achieving self-sufficiency, the Qajar state, under the direct command of Mozaffar al-Din Shah, commissioned Muhammad Mirzā Kāshif al-Saltana —the Iranian consul in Bombay— to pioneer domestic tea cultivation. An exclusive monopoly concession (emtiyāznāmeh) was granted to him in 1318 AH (1899 CE). Initial plantings in Rasht and Lahijan proved successful, with sapling numbers reportedly reaching 400,000 by 1323 AH (1905 CE). However, this promising start gave way to severe stagnation; after a quarter-century, the total cultivated area had failed to reach even 100 hectares. This study investigates the causes of this perplexing failure, examining the interplay between a flawed state-led model, the pivotal role and choices of Kāshif al-Saltana, deep-seated socio-economic barriers in Gilan, and the critical lack of industrial infrastructure.
 
Materials and Methods
The study employs a “historical–analytical method”, drawing on a wide range of “primary Persian sources”: archival correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which oversaw the project), parliamentary records from the Majles Library, and Kāšef al-Saltaneh’s own writings, notably his Dastur al- Amal-e Zarāat-e Chāy (1326 AH). Supplementary evidence from contemporary newspapers such as Hayāt va Mamāt and Falāhat va Tejārat sheds light on public reactions, government decrees, and market conditions.
To validate and contextualize these materials, the analysis also refers to comparative reports from British and Indian experts, including Dr. Hope’s 1914 inspection of tea experiments in Gilan. The approach combines descriptive reconstruction (chronology of events and policies), comparative verification (cross-checking domestic and foreign sources), and institutional interpretation (linking outcomes to patterns of governance and incentives).
Particular attention is paid to numerical evidence in the article—such as the reported 400,000 saplings planted by 1323 AH and the long gestation period of three to four years before yields—since these figures illuminate the economic logic and risk perceptions of the actors involved.
 
Discussion and Results
The investigation reveals that the failure was not agronomic but institutional, stemming from a confluence of factors that created an insurmountable barrier to development.
1. A Self-Defeating Monopoly: The state's strategy of granting an exclusive, one-sided concession to a single individual proved counterproductive. While it enabled initial experimentation, it concentrated excessive control and responsibility. Kāshif al-Saltana's execution of this monopoly exacerbated the problem. His insistence on selling saplings at a high price of one qirān each, rather than distributing them to encourage adoption, placed tea cultivation out of reach for most farmers. Contemporary local officials noted that reducing the price to a mere 500 dīnārs could have rapidly transformed Lahijan into a tea hub, yet this was never done.
2. Governmental Neglect and Bureaucratic Failure: The Qajar state consistently failed to provide the sustained financial and administrative backing its own project required. Archival records are replete with Kāshif al-Saltana's desperate requests for funds to pay Russian gardeners and cover basic costs, leading to work stoppages. By 1337 AH, state auditors noted that the treasury had invested over 60,000 tumāns in the Lahijan garden with little return, highlighting a model of spending without strategic oversight or accountability.
3. Socio-Economic Realities and Farmer Aversion: The traditional agrarian structure of Gilan was ill-suited for such a capital-intensive, long-term venture. Tea requires 3–4 years of investment (approximately 600 tumāns per hectare) before the first harvest. Peasants lacked capital, and landowners, accustomed to reliable annual crops like rice, were risk-averse. This reluctance was compounded by Kāshif al-Saltana's contractual clauses, which retained his ownership over the plants even on leased land, creating insecurity among local elites (mālekin) for whom the project appeared to be perceived as a threat to their autonomy.
4. The Critical Lack of an Industrial Chain: The project fatally focused only on cultivation, entirely neglecting the essential industrial stage of processing. Without local processing factories, the harvested green leaves had little commercial value. This failure to create an integrated value chain made tea an economically unviable proposition for any potential adopter, as they would have no means to process their harvest into a sellable commodity.
5. The Contrast of an Alternative Model: The post-WWI period demonstrated that failure was not inevitable. With the decline of the silk industry, local merchants like Seyyed Mehdi Basir al-Tojjār began promoting tea with a cooperative model, offering saplings and technical support. This community-driven approach led to a noticeable acceleration in expansion, proving that a decentralized, supportive model could succeed where the top-down monopoly had failed.
 
Conclusion
The attempt to develop tea cultivation in late Qajar Iran failed due to a fundamentally dysfunctional implementation framework. The state's monopolistic model, devoid of consistent financial support and institutional planning, placed an impossible burden on a single individual. Kāshif al-Saltana, in turn, exacerbated the situation through his individualistic and profit-oriented management, which alienated the very local stakeholders whose participation was crucial. The project's narrow focus on planting, without parallel investment in processing infrastructure, rendered it commercially unviable from the outset. This case serves as a powerful historical lesson on the limitations of top-down, monopoly-based economic initiatives that lack strategic coherence, financial commitment, and a collaborative spirit. The subsequent relative success under a more decentralized model underscores that the initial failure was a product of a specific and unsustainable approach, rather than an inherent impossibility, highlighting the critical importance of aligning institutional design with on-the-ground socio-economic realities.