Historical Studies

Historical Studies

The role and performance of the Tudeh Party in the 30th of Tir Uprising in 1331

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors
1 PhD Candidate, Department of History, Islamic Azad University, Shabestar Branch, Shabestar, Iran
2 Assistant Professor, Department of Contemporary Islam, Encyclopedia Islamica Foundation, Tehran, Iran
3 Assistant Professor, Department of History, Islamic Azad University, Shabestar Branch, Shabestar, Iran
Abstract
Abstract
The uprising of 30 Tir 1952 is one of the important events in contemporary Iranian history, which occurred following the resignation of Mohammad Mossadegh as Prime Minister and the coming to power of Ahmad Qavam. In this historical event, some have emphasized the role of the Tudeh Party in this uprising and have linked the victory of the uprising to the Tudeh Party. This article aims to examine the real role of the Tudeh Party in the 30th of Tir Uprising using first-hand documents and sources and to answer the question: What role did the Tudeh Party play in this uprising? Did the Tudeh party have an influential presence in the 30th of Tir uprising, as is said, or was it merely a false claim by the Tudeh party? The findings indicate that the leadership of the Tudeh Party did not play a central role in the uprising, and that the National Society for Combating Colonialism, a front organization of the Tudeh Party, issued a statement without the party's knowledge or guidance, calling on political parties and activists to unite and calling for the formation of a united anti-colonial front. On 30 Tir, she joined the people in pursuit of power to benefit from the fruits of the uprising, which was on the verge of victory.
Keywords: Oil industry nationalization movement, 30th of Tir Uprising, Tudeh Party of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh, Ahmad Qavam.
 
Introduction
With the establishment of the National Front of Iran under the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddegh, a rival emerged to the Tudeh Party, which saw itself as the representative of the lower social classes in the struggle for Iran's political and economic liberation. Thus, the party found itself facing a genuine popular movement that, independent of Iran's communist movement, managed to outpace the Tudeh Party in attracting opponents of the regime.
The competition between the National Front and the Tudeh Party intensified, especially during the Mossadegh government, when the National Front, in addition to attracting millions of people, was able to attract intellectuals and even a group of workers. In fact, the National Front, by doing so, attracted people whom the Tudeh Party considered exclusive to itself. During Mossadegh's first term as prime minister, the Tudeh Party did not fully and openly support his government because there was no such instruction in the policy dictated by Moscow, and at times it even showed hostility. The masses, as an influential force alongside national and religious forces, could have played a significant role in the people's victory against the British colonialists, who were themselves working against them. Why were they merely neutral observers? But what happened when they entered the scene on 30 Tir? As the party leaders claimed, were they really organized, active, and participated in the 30 Tir uprising in a proper manner? What was their goal on that day? The present research is based on the political memoirs of the leaders of the Tudeh Party, Tudeh and non-Tudeh publications, and published documents in order to provide an appropriate answer to the questions raised.
 
Materials & Method
The research method is library-based, conducted in a descriptive-analytical manner, relying on credible sources, publications, and documents related to the research topic.
 
Discussion and Result
The present study examines the role of the Tudeh Party members in the uprising of July 21, 1952 (30 Tir 1331), exploring the extent to which they contributed to its victory, as they have claimed. The July 21 uprising marked a turning point in Dr. Mosaddegh's government, succeeding due to widespread public support for him. The Tudeh Party claimed to have been the primary organizer of the uprising and to have played a decisive role in its triumph. However, the findings of this research indicate that while Tudeh members did participate in the uprising, contrary to their claims, they did not act as the vanguard but rather joined the movement in the wake of the people.
Two key points regarding the party's involvement on July 21 are significant: First, the party's leadership played no role in the uprising; instead, it was the party's rank and file—specifically, members of the National Society for Struggle Against Colonialism—who spontaneously joined the people in support of Mosaddegh by distributing pro-Mosaddegh leaflets, without any directive or guidance from the leadership. The second point concerns the motivation behind the participation of Tudeh members (particularly those from the Society for Struggle Against Colonialism), which was to capitalize on the people's victory and gain political dominance. They aligned themselves with the masses only after signs of the people's triumph became evident. Moreover, the presence of crowds in the streets provided an opportunity for Tudeh members to chant anti-American slogans and join forces with nationalists in the struggle against imperialism.
 
Conclusion
The movement to nationalize the oil industry and the 30th of Tir uprising were a true test for the Tudeh Party leadership apparatus, to show its true nature. In more than a decade of activity in the Iranian political arena and claiming to be a popular organization, the party took clear steps in contradiction to national demands during the movement. The factional differences within the leadership led to the party's strategic policy towards the Mossadegh government being misguided, and as a result, it lost the opportunity to stand with the people. In the 30th of Tir uprising, the party leadership's claim that they invited the masses to attend this day was not true, and the masses who joined the people did so spontaneously and without guidance from the party leadership. Unlike the people, who acted intelligently and quickly and changed the course of political developments, they followed the people on the 30th of Tir and sought to benefit from the fruits of the people's victory with political goals and dominance over affairs. The party's passive performance was rooted in dependence on foreigners and the intellectual constraints of the leadership apparatus on the one hand, and losing the political arena to its rival (the National Front) and profiteering and taking advantage of opportunities (in its proximity to Qavam) on the other. Therefore, the party's attempt to participate in the uprising, despite its efforts and the realities, did not bear fruit, and the nature of this non-national organization became increasingly apparent to the people.
Keywords
Subjects

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Newspapers
Adineh (instead of Shahbaz), (September 7, 1952), number 300. Akharin Nabard (December 15, 1951), No. 17.
Bakhtar Emrouz (July 21, 1952) No. 859.
------- (July 18, 1952), No. 865.
------- (July 19, 1952) No. 866.
------- (July 31, 1952) No. 867.
Besoye Ayandhe (October 20, 1990), No. 121.
------ (December 8, 1940) No. 174.
----- (18 Aribehest 1330) No. 265.
----- (May 14, 1951), No. 269.
------ (May 15, 1951) No. 270.
------ (May 19, 1951) No. 273.
------ (August 13, 1951) No. 342.
------ (January 15, 1951) No. 466.
Ettelaat. (June 12, 1952), No. 7824.
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----- (July 15, 1952) No. 7850.
----- (July 18, 1952) No. 7853.
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----- (July 18, 1952) No. 7861.
Farman Tarikh (instead of the promise of the future), (December 12, 1955), No. 60.
Hezb mellat Iran (July 19, 1952), No. 86.
Dej (27 Tir 1331), No. 609.
--- (July 19, 1952) No. 610.
--- (July 10, 1952) No. 611.
--- (July 31, 1952) No. 612.
--- (August 1, 1952) No. 613.
Navid Ayandeh (March 20, 1990) No. 14.
------ (March 20, 1990) No. 15.
------ (March 18, 1940) No. 228.
----- (July 15, 1952) No. 607.
----- (July 16, 1952) No. 608.
Shahbaz (December 14, 1951) No. 95.
---(July 16, 1952), No. 265.
--- (July 18, 1952) No. 266.
--- (July 19, 1952) No. [267].
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Thesis
Fardousiyan, Hamidreza (2000-2001). The Political Thought and Governing Method of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh. Supervisor: Sadegh Zibakalam; Advisor: Naser Takmil Homayoun.
Volume 17, Issue 1 - Serial Number 33
Spring and Summer 2026-2027
April 2026
Pages 227-253

  • Receive Date 25 September 2024
  • Revise Date 02 March 2025
  • Accept Date 12 April 2025